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A B S T R A C T
We investigate how family ownership influences the industry-diversifying nature of M&As by listed
companies in Continental Europe and the corresponding shareholder value effects at deal announce-
ment. For a large sample of 3485 M&As during 2005–2013, we observe that acquirers having a family as
the largest shareholder are less inclined to take over an unrelated target firm than lone-founder and other
types of non-family firms. However, as the size of the family ownership stake increases, family firms
become more eager to follow an industry-diversifying M&A strategy. While industry-diversifying M&As
are associated with lower abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders on average, we also observe that
family ownership fully reverses this negative effect. We therefore conclude that those unrelated M&As,
although still representing a conflict of interest with the family firm’s minority investors, do not destroy
shareholder value on average.
ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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“Fortunes are made through concentration and are kept
through diversification.”de Visscher, 2003
The ownership structure of many listed companies in Conti-
nental Europe (CE) is characterized by high concentration and
family control (e.g., Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). Those families are usually also
active in the management, occupy board positions, and hold a
long-term investment horizon vis-à-vis their firm (e.g., Caprio,
Croci, & Del Giudice, 2011; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel,
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Recent research on European
listed firms provides evidence of a non-linear relation between
family ownership and firm performance/value (Kowalewski,
Oleksandr, & Stetsyuk, 2009; Maury, 2006; Poutziouris, Savva, &
Hadjielias, 2015). Specifically, for non-majority family ownership,
firms exhibit greater profitability and higher stock market* Corresponding author at: KU Leuven & Vlerick Business School, Reep 1, 9000
Ghent, Belgium.
E-mail address: corneel.defrancq@vlerick.com (C. Defrancq).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
1877-8585/ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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no longer arise, which could indicate that a value-expropriation
effect now offsets the positive monitoring and/or incentive-
alignment effect (Maury, 2006). However, none of these earlier
studies has examined mechanisms through which such ownership
effects could develop.
In this study, we focus on one specific channel, that is, the
influence of family ownership on the industry-diversifying nature
of a firm’s M&A strategy. The family’s view on this issue may
indeed diverge from that of the firm’s other shareholders. Stock
market investors  either retail or professional  can diversify
their investment portfolio directly, by buying shares in various
listed firms. Hence, they likely prefer each listed company to follow
a highly focused value strategy, thereby concentrating on its core
competencies. In contrast, the wealth of a large family owner is
usually undiversified and heavily tied up in the family firm
(e.g., Eisenmann, 2002; Hautz, Mayer, & Stadler, 2013), forcing
families to think about more creative ways to achieve a lower risk
profile for their investment portfolio. Once having decided to
expand the family business, powerful families can thus induce
their firm to engage in industry-diversifying M&As. Firms
controlled by other types of large shareholders, such as lonenership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
1 Amihud and Lev (1981) investigate in more detail the role of managerial
motives in conglomerate M&As, using data on 309 transactions by US listed firms
during 1961–1970. They find that management-controlled firms, i.e. firms in which
no single party holds at least 10% of the firm’s shares outstanding, initiate a
significantly larger number of industry-diversifying M&As on average (i.e. 1.10) as
compared to firms that are weakly (0.77) or strongly (0.36) controlled by a single
large shareholder. These findings thus confirm the idea that management hinges on
M&As to implement a risk-reduction strategy in order to protect its own wealth and
occupation.
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unlikely to exhibit this same desire for diversification.
Relying on a large sample of 3485 M&As during 2005–2013, we
find that family-controlled acquirers prefer industry-focused deals
at low, i.e., non-majority levels of family ownership. Because those
horizontal M&As are associated with greater shareholder abnor-
mal returns on average, we infer that non-majority family control
is beneficial for the family firm’s minority investors. However, as
the size of the family stake increases, family-controlled acquirers
become more eager to select an unrelated target firm. The latter
result thus indicates that dominant family owners may use their
power to pursue an M&A strategy that allows realizing a lower risk
profile for their firm. However, we do not find that shareholder
abnormal returns at deal announcement are significantly smaller
for industry-diversifying M&As made by firms with majority family
ownership. Those unrelated M&As, although still representing a
conflict of interest with minority investors, thus do not destroy
shareholder value on average.
Our study makes a number of important contributions to the
literature on family firms. First, by focusing on a firm’s M&A
strategy, our study offers a potential rationale for the earlier-
detected non-linear relation between family ownership and firm
performance/value in European listed firms. Our findings prove
consistent with this non-linear relation but may also invite other
researchers to further open the black box by exploring other
channels. Second, our study is also a response to the claim that
scant empirical research has examined the impact of family control
on corporate diversification (e.g., Steier, Chrisman, & Chua, 2004).
The scarce and US-based research as to how family ownership
affects the industry-diversifying nature of corporate investments
has found conflicting results (see Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Gomez-
Mejia, Makri, & Larazza, 2010; Miller, Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010).
While the study by Miller et al. (2010) is the most related to ours, it
encompasses a very broad M&A definition, including all stock
purchases of at least five percent. Many small deals in the Miller
et al. sample could have been motivated by a financial-investment
rationale and thus were not long-term strategic investments. In
contrast, we only investigate transactions in which the acquirer
obtained majority control of the target firm. Next, from a
theoretical point of view, we note that different types of large
shareholders (‘principals’) behave differently. Our study therefore
also endorses the recent direction in empirical family business
research to separate true family firms from lone-founder firms
(e.g., Miller, Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007; Cannella,
Jones, & Withers, 2015). Another theoretical contribution arising
from our study is that a family’s various objectives appear to
receive different priorities, depending upon the family’s owner-
ship stake.
The remainder of our article is organized as follows. First, we
present an overview of the relevant literature and develop our
hypotheses. We thereafter introduce the sample and variable
measurements and report and discuss the results from our
empirical analyses. Finally, the last section presents our con-
clusions.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
In this section, we first briefly review the literature as to how
industry-diversifying corporate investments, which include unre-
lated M&As, can affect shareholder value. We focus on M&As
because they involve major strategic decisions with a clearly
defined announcement date. Next, we present what the literature
so far has argued and found as to why managers and large share-
holders may pursue this type of investments. Finally, we develop
our own hypotheses as to the impact of a large family owner on the
odds that its firm follows an industry-diversifying M&A strategy.Please cite this article in press as: C. Defrancq, et al., Influence of family ow
Empirical evidence from Continental Europe, Journal of Family BusinesWe also infer the implications for acquirer shareholder value at
M&A announcement.
2.1. Literature review
Until now, the finance literature has noted that corporate
diversification and firm value tend to be negatively associated.
Although some scholars have emphasized the financial synergy
benefits of diversification (e.g., Stein, 1997), the prevailing
wisdom in the finance literature is that diversified firms sell
at a discount (e.g., Martin & Sayrak, 2003;; Rajan, Servaes, &
Zingales, 2000). Specifically related to M&As, both Andrade,
Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001 and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn,
2008 conclude in their review article that industry-focused
transactions produce higher post-deal cash flows than unrelated
M&As. Likewise, Martynova and Renneboog (2011) find for a
sample of 2419 M&As in Europe during 1993–2001 that the
takeover of a related target firm results in positive abnormal
returns for acquirer shareholders at deal announcement,
whereas M&A diversification seems to destroy shareholder value
on average. Potentially negative value consequences arising from
corporate diversification  which can also arise from conglom-
erate M&As  encompass extra organizational complexity, cross-
subsidization, and limited operating synergy potential. Diversi-
fied firms are also more difficult to understand compared to
highly industry-focused firms. The ensuing information asym-
metries can then shield those diversified firms from the scrutiny
and discipline of capital markets (Bruner, 2004). In the end,
stock market investors will account for the enlarged threat of
agency problems by discounting the firm’s stock price.
Given the above negative value consequences of diversification,
a number of scholars have sought to explain why firms may
nonetheless engage in it, for example by means of industry-
diversifying M&As. In the M&A literature, most attention has gone
to the principal–agent (P–A) conflict of interest that is driven by a
separation between ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). When firm ownership is widely dispersed, management
may have the incentive and the power to pursue its own interests
(e.g., Enriques & Volpin, 2007;; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). As regards
M&As, managers can initiate transactions not only to increase their
power, prestige, and compensation but also to diversify their own
wealth and improve their job security. Because managers’ income
and occupation are closely related to firm performance, the risks
associated with their income and employment cannot easily be
separated from the firm’s business risk. Moreover, because their
human capital is relatively illiquid, managers cannot easily
diversify their employment risk either (Amihud & Lev, 1981;;
Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). As a result, by buying a target firm
whose cash flows are less than perfectly correlated with those of
their own firm, managers may aim to reduce the firm’s risk.1
However, those unrelated M&As are not necessarily in the best
interests of the firm’s shareholders, who can diversify theirnership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
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companies.2
While corporate diversification could indicate a P–A agency
problem, other scholars have argued that it might also hint at a
conflict between majority and minority shareholders, i.e., a
principal–principal (P–P) conflict of interest. Thereby, the role of
large family owners has received special attention because a
family’s wealth is usually undiversified and heavily tied up in the
family business (e.g., Eisenmann, 2002; Hautz et al., 2013).
However, Anderson & Reeb (2003a) find for a sample of 319 S&P
500 firms that founding families adhere to a highly focused
investment strategy. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010), using data on 360
US listed firms, confirm this negative relation between family
control and corporate diversification. In contrast, Miller et al.
(2010) reach the opposite conclusion from examining the industry-
diversifying nature of firms’ M&As for 898 Fortune-1000 firms.
They conclude that although family firms are generally less likely
to engage in M&As, family ownership positively affects a firm’s
propensity to make an unrelated M&A. While this study is most
closely related to ours, Miller et al. (2010) use a very broad
definition of M&As, including all stock purchases of at least five
percent. Many small deals in the Miller et al. (2010) sample could
thus have been motivated by a financial-investment rationale and
were therefore outside the firms’ core industry. Moreover,
investing a company’s resources in highly liquid assets is not
diversification any more than having cash is diversification.
Additionally, research as to the effects of family ownership on
corporate diversification has focused solely on listed firms in the
USA.
Next, prior research suggests that concentrated ownership and
particularly ownership by insiders can help reduce the P–A conflict
of interest between managers and shareholders. Hermalin and
Weisbach (1991) find for a sample of 142 NYSE listed firms that
corporate value (Tobin’s Q) increases with ownership by managers
and directors for insider stakes between 5% and 20%. For insider
stakes above 20%, Tobin’s Q wanes with it, which likely reflects
insider entrenchment. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a similar
non-linear relation but conclude that the turning point is 50% for
firms sampled in 1976 and 40% for firms sampled in 1986. Other
scholars have specifically explored the role of family ownership,
also reporting evidence of a non-linear relation. Anderson & Reeb
(2003b) show for 329 US listed firms that firms in which the
founding family retains an equity stake and/or is represented in the
management or board outperform non-family firms, using return
on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q as dependent variables. However,
those positive family effects gradually disappear as the family’s
ownership stake increases to above 30%. Anderson and Reeb
explain their findings by a changing incentive structure as the
family becomes too dominant, from value maximization to
entrenchment. This change may even result in various forms of2 The agency theory of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) implies that especially
managers with easy access to financial resources may rely upon M&As to pursue
their own goals. Accordingly, the stock market returns for M&As announced by
cash-rich firms with dispersed ownership are conjectured to be negative. In line
with this idea, Harford (1999) finds that cash-rich acquirers in the USA between
1950 and 1994 on average destroyed seven cents in shareholder value for every
excess dollar of cash reserves held.
Please cite this article in press as: C. Defrancq, et al., Influence of family ow
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examining 508 Fortune-1000 companies, confirm that family
ownership creates value but only when the founder serves as CEO
or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Those effects already manifest for
non-majority family ownership because the average family stake
equals only 16% in their sample, with a standard deviation of 18%.4
More recent research by Miller et al. (2007) reveals that any
positive family effects in US listed firms disappear once lone-
founder firms are no longer blended with true family firms.
A few other scholars have analyzed how family ownership
relates to firm performance and value in Europe. Maury (2006)
investigates a sample of 1672 non-financial listed firms in Western
Europe with financial data from 1998 and ownership data from
2003 and finds that non-majority family ownership is associated
with a 16% higher ROA and a 7% larger Tobin’s Q. Kowalewski et al.
(2009) reach similar conclusions for a sample of 217 Polish listed
firms during 1997–2005. Poutziouris et al. (2015) also obtain
evidence of a positive family effect for 107 UK listed firms, provided
that family ownership remains below 31%. Finally, some research-
ers have linked family ownership to shareholder value effects at
the time an M&A is first publicly announced, yet with no consistent
results. While Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010) detect a
positive family effect for a sample of 124 majority-acquisitions of
European listed firms during 2002–2004, Caprio et al. (2011) find
no influence at all for a much larger sample of 2145 M&As by 777
CE listed companies between 1998 and 2008. However, that
research does not specifically integrate the potential relation
between family ownership and the industry-diversifying nature of
a firm’s M&As into the analyses.
2.2. Theory and hypotheses
To develop our hypotheses as to the influence of a large family
shareholder on the odds that its firm adheres to an industry-
diversifying M&A strategy conditional upon pursuing external
growth, we integrate the P–A and P–P theoretical frameworks.
Specifically, we posit that family control can be a mechanism to
mitigate the P–A incentive problem at low levels of family
ownership but may evolve to a P–P conflict of interest when family
control is too dominant. We consider the turning point from non-
dominant to dominant family ownership an empirical question.
But, based upon our review of the literature, we expect a non-
dominant position to fall in a range from 20% to 50%.
When a family shareholder holds a non-trivial but non-
dominant ownership stake in its firm, it should be able to restrain
management’s self-interested behavior when engaging in M&As.
Hence, this large family shareholder will prevent management
from pursuing M&As that do not maximize value, such as in
industry-diversifying M&As. First, when its stake remains limited,
the family is unlikely to occupy a majority of executive and director
positions, and, hence, a P–A conflict of interest could surface.
Nonetheless, the family, possibly with the support of other non-
family shareholders, should be able to curb it. Indeed, the family
will have the incentive and the power to induce management to3 Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001 empirically investigate nepotism, i.e., the act of
favoritism granted to relatives, for a sample of Western European and East Asian
listed firms. They find that 68.12% (57.10%) of Europe’s (Asia’s) families appoint a
family member as CEO or Chairman for the companies in which they control at least
20 percent of voting rights. Expropriation through tunneling refers to the transfer of
assets and profits out of the listed company for the benefit of its dominant owner
(Johnson, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). Tunneling can be realized in
various ways: outright theft or fraud, asset sales at non-market-conforming prices,
loans at non-market interest rates, excessive executive compensation, or an
expropriation of corporate opportunities.
4 The summary statistics on family ownership in other US-based studies (e.g.,
Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 2003b; Miller et al., 2010) prove highly comparable.
nership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
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benefit of all shareholders. However, the family will not be so
powerful that it can pursue its own interests, particularly when its
firm is publicly listed. For one thing, if the family were to induce
managers/directors to deviate from maximizing shareholder value
and collude with them to share the ensuing private benefits, the
family firm could become subject to a hostile takeover bid (see also
Caprio et al., 2011). With its limited stake, the family might not be
able to prevent a majority of the firm’s other shareholders selling
out to the corporate raider. This mechanism by itself is likely to
impose discipline on the listed family firm, especially because
families also esteem the non-pecuniary aspects of family owner-
ship (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Handler, 1990; Schulze,
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a). Moreover, their more altruistic attitude
vis-à-vis the family firm as its steward, their long-term investment
horizon, and their wish to transfer the business to future
generations (e.g., Cannella et al., 2015; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2007) may motivate families to concentrate on maximizing the
firm’s stock market valuation to realize their other objective, i.e.,
maintaining control. The above rationales likely play a crucial role
in M&As, which are major strategic decisions for a corporation,
thereby providing family firms with a strong incentive to pursue
deals that add to shareholder value. As a result, we expect stock
market investors to respond positively to M&As by acquirers
controlled by a family with a non-trivial but non-dominant
ownership stake.
In contrast, non-family firms, either widely held or controlled
by another type of large shareholder, often prove unable to induce
management to focus on maximizing shareholder value when
engaging in M&As. Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007 and Duggal and
Millar (1999) argue that banks, pension funds, and other financial
entities may not be able to play an independent monitoring
function in M&As because they may also consider their current and
potential future business relations with the listed firm. Hence,
those large non-family shareholders may consent to lower-value
deals if the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs. As to lone-
founder firms, Miller et al. (2007) note that they spend more on
R&D and capital investment and achieve higher rates of revenue
growth than family firms. Likewise, Cannella et al. (2015) contend
that lone-founder firms often include an entrepreneurial or growth
orientation. When expanding through M&As, we therefore expect
those lone-founder firms to pursue deals that contribute to
shareholder value, regardless of whether the target firm is inside or
outside their core industry.
In sum, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. If family ownership is non-dominant, then the
likelihood that a family-controlled firm will pursue an industry-
diversifying M&A strategy is relatively low.
Hypothesis 1b. If family ownership is non-dominant, then the
impact of family ownership on acquirer shareholders’ abnormal
returns at deal notification will be positive.
When a family shareholder holds a too-large ownership
stake, it can (ab)use its power to put pressure on the firm’s
managers or directors to steer particular corporate decisions,
resulting in a P–P conflict of interest with the firm’s minority
investors. A dominant family owner could thus induce its firm
to adhere to an industry-diversifying M&A strategy to reduce
overall company risk. The family firm might also be better able
to achieve this diversification since it can buy unlisted
companies. First, both academic and business consulting studies
agree that, in contrast to other types of large shareholders,
families’ wealth in particular is usually largely tied into the
family business. Anderson & Reeb (2003a) show that families
appearing on Forbes’ list of the 400 Wealthiest Americans and inPlease cite this article in press as: C. Defrancq, et al., Influence of family ow
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over 69% of their wealth invested in their firm. McCullough
(2010) argues that the undiversified nature of family wealth is
the main reason for the existence of family offices that help
families manage the shift from creating wealth to sustaining it,
thereby engaging primarily in diversification. Notably, Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2007) contend that family wealth includes not only
a financial component, i.e., cash flow rights, but also a
socioemotional component, which represents the ability to
exercise authority, the conservation of the family’s social capital,
and the opportunity to be altruistic to family members (see also
Handler, 1990; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003b). This latter
component might further strengthen the family’s aversion
toward corporate risk, inducing it to focus on maintaining
control. More surprisingly, these authors further contend that
family firms could be reluctant to diversify their business
because doing so indirectly poses a hazard to the family’s
socioemotional wealth (SEW). Specifically, they contend that the
greater complexity arising from a diversifying growth strategy
enhances the need for delegation and outside managerial talent,
thereby potentially threatening the family’s SEW (see also
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno,
2012; Sánchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014). Moreover, they note that
diversification requires raising extra capital, usually by means of
debt. Because family firms are more averse to the risk of losing
control than other firms and because a higher debt ratio
increases that risk, Gomez-Mejia et al. claim that family firms
might be less willing to diversify and take on this extra debt (see
also Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Schulze et al., 2003a).
However, in the context of M&As, the above arguments could
apply just as well to industry-related transactions; it is indeed
growth by itself that may induce firms to seek external financing
and involve non-family executives. In support of our arguments,
the M&A literature has highlighted that acquiring firms must
think about how to finance and pay for their M&As, regardless of
whether a deal is inside or outside their core industry (e.g.,
Faccio & Masulis, 2005; Martynova & Renneboog, 2009).
Likewise, firms’ execution of an M&A alone is often followed
by top-management turnover (e.g., Lehn & Zhao, 2006;Walsh
1988,). In sum, industry-diversifying M&As are unlikely to
expose family firms to a larger debt ratio or to a greater need
for outside managerial talent and expertise than industry-
focused M&As; however, they could help reduce the family
firm’s overall risk profile.
Now turning to the relation between family ownership and a
firm’s M&A strategy, we expect that family shareholders with a
too-large ownership stake can pursue their own interests when
engaging in M&As. Hence, those family blockholders can force
their company into buying an unrelated target firm. When such a
risk-reducing or wealth-preserving strategy is pursued, a P–P
conflict of interest with the firm’s minority investors arises. Indeed,
the latter shareholders can diversify their investment portfolio
directly, without lengthy negotiations and without having to pay
an acquisition premium, by buying shares in various listed firms.
Hence, they likely prefer each listed company to follow a highly
focused value strategy, thereby concentrating on its core compe-
tencies. We expect this P–P conflict of interest to emerge especially
when the family holds a very large ownership stake in its firm. Only
when families control a sufficiently large fraction of voting rights
do they have the power to force decisions that could be harmful to
other investors. Moreover, only when their stake is large enough
can those family shareholders afford not to worry about an outside
control event, i.e., a hostile takeover bid on their firm (see also
Caprio et al., 2011). Accordingly, stock market investors might
respond less positively to industry-diversifying M&As announced
by acquirers with a dominant family owner. However, this is not tonership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
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engage in lower-value M&As. In many cases, the magnitude of the
family financial wealth at stake will be sufficient to impose
discipline on the M&A strategy of those firms.
In contrast, dominant shareholders in non-family firms 
perhaps with the exception of lone founders  usually hold a far
better diversified investment portfolio and, thus, should be less
inclined to use their power in the firm to pursue an industry-
diversifying M&A strategy. While lone founders also have a strong
desire to retain discretion/control, for themselves rather than for
their offspring, Cannella et al. (2015) emphasize that lone founders
also view their firm as an extension of themselves; hence, they are
more committed to innovation and economic pursuits relative to
family firms and may find more alignment with the goal of
shareholder value maximization, even when controlling a very
large fraction of their firm’s voting rights.
In sum, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. If family ownership is dominant, then the
likelihood that a family-controlled firm will pursue an industry-
diversifying M&A strategy is relatively high.
Hypothesis 2b. If family ownership is dominant, then the impact
of family ownership on acquirer shareholders’ abnormal returns at
deal notification will be positive, unless the firm pursues an
industry-diversifying M&A strategy.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Sample
Our sample includes all M&As made by listed acquiring firms
with corporate headquarters in Continental Europe and an-
nounced between January 1, 2005 and April 30, 2013.5 As a
sample selection criterion, we only select M&As that are included
in the Zephyr database.6 We next only retain deals for which the
acquirer held a stake less than 50% before deal announcement and
obtained majority control of the target firm as a result. Moreover,
the acquirer must be listed on a stock exchange so that we can
compute acquirer shareholder value effects upon deal announce-
ment. The above criteria result in an initial sample of 9710 M&As.
We subsequently remove the acquirers active in the financial
services industry (US SIC code 6) because those firms are often
subject to specific regulations and because they file their financial
reports under different accounting standards (1888 deals). Finally,
we only retain M&As for which acquirer ownership data are
available in the Amadeus database. The above selection criteria
result in a final sample of 3485 M&As. So, the unit of analysis in our5 We remove acquirers headquartered in the UK and Ireland, as those firms
operate in a different legal and institutional environment (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998).
In Continental Europe, minority-investor protection and disclosure standards are
typically weaker, which also engenders a lower stock market development. Such a
context thus provides an ideal setting for agency problems to thrive. Besides,
ownership concentration and family control are also much more important in
Continental Europe (e.g., Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999).
6 The Zephyr database is commercialized by Bureau van Dijk and contains
information on more than one million transactions worldwide, with pan-European
deals dating back to 1997. Compared to Thomson Financial and Mergerstat, Zephyr
has a larger coverage of European and smaller M&As. Furthermore, it can be linked
easily to the Amadeus database (also Bureau Van Dijk), including the annual
accounts and ownership data of more than 18 million European firms. We started
data collection in 2005, as listed firms in the EU henceforth had to rely on the same
accounting standards (IFRS). Also, the coverage of ownership data in Amadeus is
much better as of 2005.
Please cite this article in press as: C. Defrancq, et al., Influence of family ow
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value of 351.8 million EUR (median of 17.7 million EUR).
3.2. Variable measurements
In this section, we present our variables of interest. First, we
explain how we identify a family-controlled acquiring firm. We
also elaborate on our various measures capturing the magnitude of
family ownership for the subsample of family-controlled firms.
Next, we explain in more detail our definition of an industry-
diversifying M&A. Finally, we introduce the event study method-
ology to compute acquirer shareholder value effects upon deal
announcement.
Miller et al. (2007) provide an overview of the myriad of
definitions of family firms in academic research, finding it difficult
to reach a consensus on the most appropriate one. In this study, we
define a family firm as one in which multiple members of the same
family are involved as major owners, directors, or managers, either
contemporaneously or over time (see also Cannella et al., 2015). To
operationalize it, we first identify each sample firm’s largest
ultimate shareholder. To that end, we only consider blockholders
ultimately controlling at least 5% of voting rights (see also
Anderson & Reeb, 2003a;; Miller et al., 2007, 2010).7 In contrast
to prior research assuming stable ownership stakes over time (e.g.,
Maury, 2006), we collect each firm’s ownership data as close as
possible to but before the M&A announcement date. We also
account for each shareholder’s total, i.e., direct as well as indirect
ownership. For the firms on which Amadeus only reports direct
equity stakes, we assume that the corresponding owners hold no
indirect voting rights. To identify the family-controlled acquirers in
our sample, we next check whether the firm’s largest ultimate
shareholder is categorized as one or more named individuals or
families in Amadeus. We require that at least two owners, two
directors, or two managers have the same surname to separate true
family firms from lone-founder firms. However, we also recognize
that firms not meeting this last criterion could still be family firms,
for example when sons-in-law or daughters-in-law became
involved as owners, directors, or managers over time. To also
correctly classify those last remaining firms, we manually inspect
their websites (company history, annual reports, and other
contents) to verify whether they meet our above criteria for
family firms. Lone-founder firms thus relate to businesses in which
no relatives of the founder(s) are involved.
To separate family-controlled acquirers from non-family
acquirers, we set the dummy FAM5 equal to one for acquirers
in which the largest ultimate shareholder is a family controlling
at least 5% of voting rights. To analyze the effects of family
ownership, we compute FAMBLOCK as the fraction of direct and
indirect voting rights controlled by the firm’s family. Addition-
ally, we construct dummy variables to distinguish between non-
dominant and dominant family ownership. Starting from the
results in our literature review, we put forward two cutoffs, one
based on 20% and another on 50%. This results in three extra
dummy variables: FAM5_20, FAM20_50, and FAM50_100 equal
one for acquirers with a fraction of family voting rights in the
ranges of [5,20],]20,50], and]50,100], respectively. The 50% cutoff
allows us to distinguish between minority and majority family
ownership (see also Caprio et al., 2011; Maury, 2006). We also7 When relying on a 10% cutoff (e.g., Caprio et al., 2011), only 23 out of the 547
M&As made by a family-controlled acquirer (4.2%) were re-classified as being
initiated by a non-family-controlled acquirer. Increasing this threshold from 5% to
10% did not materially affect the conclusions from our multivariate analyses.
nership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
Table 1
Dependent and explanatory variables.
Dependent variables Definition
DIVERSIFICATION Dummy variable that equals one if none of the three-digit US SIC industries in which the acquirer is active equals one of the
three-digit US SIC industries of the target firm, and zero otherwise.







FAM5 Dummy variable that equals one if the largest ultimate shareholder is recorded as ‘Individual, Individual(s) or family(ies)’,
‘One or more named individuals or families’, or ‘Unnamed private shareholder’ in the Amadeus database, and if that
shareholder controls at least 5% of acquirer voting rights. Additionally, at least two owners, two directors, or two managers
should have the same surname or, if not, should be related to each other by means of a family bond, either contemporaneously
or over time.
+/ +/
FAMBLOCK Fraction of voting rights controlled by the acquirer’s largest ultimate family shareholder (minimum of 5%). The sum of direct
and indirect voting rights is used if the family also holds indirect voting rights; direct voting rights are used otherwise.
+ +
FAMx_y Dummy variable that equals one if a family blockholder controls >=x% and <y% of acquirer voting rights. +/ +/












CASH RATIO Cash and cash equivalents/total assets at year-end before M&A announcement. + 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt/total assets at year-end before M&A announcement.  +
FIRM SIZE Natural log of total assets (thousands of euro) at year-end before M&A announcement. + 
M/B Market-to-book ratio: market value of common equity divided by the balance sheet value of common equity before M&A
announcement.
+ 
TOTAL RISK Standard deviation of monthly stock returns [months 60 to 1] before M&A announcement. + 
CONGLOMERATE Number of industries (measured at the three-digit US SIC level) in which the acquirer is active before M&A announcement.  +
IND. GROWTH Median of the one-year lagged sales growth rate in the acquirer’s primary three-digit US SIC industry, constructed from all the
consolidated financial statements available in the Amadeus database in the year before M&A announcement.
 +
IND. CONC Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index of sales in the acquirer’s primary three-digit US SIC industry, constructed from all
the consolidated financial statements available in the Amadeus database in the year before M&A announcement.
+ 
MARKETCAP_GDP Market capitalization of all the publicly listed companies in the acquirer country as a percentage of GDP at year-end before
M&A announcement.
 +
Table 1 presents definitions of all the dependent and explanatory variables, with the hypothesized effect of the explanatory variables on the incidence of industry
diversification and on acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at deal announcement.
8 A number of examples can clarify our procedure. In 2007, Hunter Douglas NV
(active in US sic industries 179, 259, and 871) acquired Electronic Solutions Inc.
(active in US sic industry 369). This deal is thus classified as an industry-diversifying
transaction (DIVERSIFICATION = 1). In 2006, Telekom Austria AG (active in US sic
industries 481 and 737) bought Etel Austria AG (active in US sic industries 481 and
737). This deal is classified as industry-focused (DIVERSIFICATION = 0). Our
procedure differs somewhat from that used by Miller et al. (2010), who classify
an M&A as industry-diversifying if the acquirer’s primary US sic code differs from
that of the target firm. So, unlike Miller et al. (2010), we still categorize a deal as
industry-focused if the acquirer, realizing 60% of its sales in US sic industry A and
40% of its sales in US sic industry B, buys a target firm that realizes 100% of its sales in
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Finally, we create the dummy variables OTHER5, OTHER5_20,
OTHER20_50, and OTHER50_100 to identify acquirers with
another, i.e., non-family large shareholder. Those dummy
variables equal one when the acquirer’s largest ultimate
shareholder is a non-family-related one controlling a specific
fraction of voting rights. For acquirers without a shareholder
holding at least 5% of voting rights, the variables FAMx_y and
OTHERx_y have a value of zero.
To identify the industry-diversifying nature of the M&As in our
sample, we note that prior research has often relied on US SIC
codes (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010;
Miller et al., 2010). Although the Fama and French (1997)
classification into 49 industries seems more manageable than a
categorization based on three-digit or four-digit US sic codes, it in
fact also relies on those sic codes. Next, the TNIC classification of
industries, as proposed by Hoberg and Philips (2010), draws on a
text-based analysis of 10-K product descriptions. However, those
10-K reports are not readily available for listed firms in Continental
Europe; the same applies to the input-output data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, which are collected only for the US economy.
In sum, because US SIC codes are widely used and easily accessible
for the firms in our sample, we rely on three-digit US SIC codes to
identify industry-diversifying M&As. Hence, we set the dummy
DIVERSIFICATION equal to one if none of the acquirer’s three-digitPlease cite this article in press as: C. Defrancq, et al., Influence of family ow
Empirical evidence from Continental Europe, Journal of Family BusinesSIC codes equals one of the target firm’s three-digit SIC codes.8 We
later implement robustness checks based on four-digit US SIC
codes.
Finally, we rely on the event study methodology to evaluate the
value creation in each M&A from the point of view of acquirer
shareholders. Research in corporate finance typically posits that
stock market investors impound the economic gains from
synergies and/or a change in corporate control in the stock price
of the combining companies at deal notification. The most
important advantage of the event study methodology is indeed
that it is forward looking, implicitly accounting for the present
value of all future M&A gains. Also, it can be manipulated less easily
than accounting-based performance metrics, and it is unrelated toUS sic industry B.
nership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
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capture the perceived value creation in each deal for the acquirer’s
minority investors, we calculate acquirer shareholder abnormal
returns surrounding the deal announcement date (day 0). Those
abnormal returns are computed as the differences between
realized and expected returns. Expected returns are obtained
from the market model, which is estimated over a clean period
[250,51] relative to the event date:
Rjt ¼ aj þ bjRmt þ ejt
where Rjt is the realized return on the stock of company j on day t,
Rmt is the realized return on MSCI Europe on day t, aj is the
intercept and bj is a measure of firm j’s systematic risk.Table 2







N Col% N Row% 
Year of announcement
2005 426 8.29% 56 13.15% 
2006 482 9.38% 66 13.69% 
2007 572 11.13% 107 18.71% 
2008 522 10.16% 77 14.75% 
2009 289 5.62% 35 12.11% 
2010 444 8.64% 73 16.44% 
2011 395 7.69% 70 17.72% 
2012 171 3.33% 29 16.96% 
2013 184 3.58% 34 18.48% 
Acquirer industry
SIC 0: Agriculture, forestry, fishing 31 0.60% 5 16.13% 
SIC 1: Mining 191 3.72% 19 9.95% 
SIC 2: Food 448 8.72% 59 13.17% 
SIC 3: Manufacturing 924 17.98% 109 11.80% 
SIC 4: Transportation 353 6.87% 24 6.80% 
SIC 5: Wholesale 288 5.60% 59 20.49% 
SIC 7: Personal and business services 874 17.01% 212 24.26% 
SIC 8: Health, legal and social services 372 7.24% 58 15.59% 
SIC 9: Public administration 4 0.08% 2 50.00% 
Acquirer country
AT: Austria 64 1.25% 5 7.81% 
BE: Belgium 131 2.55% 10 7.63% 
BG: Bulgaria 11 0.21% 2 18.18% 
CZ: Czech Republic 6 0.12% 0 0.00% 
DE: Germany 491 9.55% 87 17.72% 
DK: Denmark 78 1.52% 0 0.00% 
EE: Estonia 6 0.12% 0 0.00% 
ES: Spain 163 3.17% 18 11.04% 
FI: Finland 298 5.80% 51 17.11% 
FR: France 887 17.26% 204 23.00% 
GR: Greece 1 0.02% 1 100.00% 
HU: Hungary 1 0.02% 0 0.00% 
IT: Italy 168 3.27% 29 17.26% 
LT: Lithuania 6 0.12% 0 0.00% 
LU: Luxembourg 6 0.12% 0 0.00% 
LV: Latvia 3 0.06% 0 0.00% 
NL: Netherlands 300 5.84% 10 3.33% 
PL: Poland 183 3.56% 31 16.94% 
PT: Portugal 32 0.62% 1 3.13% 
RO: Romania 5 0.10% 0 0.00% 
SE: Sweden 621 12.08% 98 15.78% 
SI: Slovenia 21 0.41% 0 0.00% 
SK: Slovakia 3 0.06% 0 0.00% 
Total 3485 100.00% 547 15.70% 
Table 2 displays the absolute and percentage distribution of the year of M&A announceme
family-controlled and non-family-controlled acquirers, and for the subsamples of indu
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Empirical evidence from Continental Europe, Journal of Family BusinesThe acquirer shareholder abnormal returns are summed over
the event window [T1; T2] to produce a cumulative abnormal
return (CAR). We use the [-1,+1] event window in our main tests
but also work with other windows to account for a potential stock
price run-up before deal notification (e.g., Craninckx & Huyghe-
baert, 2011; Martynova & Renneboog, 2011). However, a drawback
of extending the event window is that confounding events could
impact the CAR. We examine the statistical significance of the CAR
by means of the test statistic developed by Dodd and Warner
(1983). For each security i, the standardized abnormal return on
day t (SARit) is computed by dividing the abnormal return on that







N Row% N Row% N Row%
370 86.85% 140 32.86% 286 67.14%
416 86.31% 153 31.74% 329 68.26%
465 81.29% 183 31.99% 389 68.01%
445 85.25% 196 37.55% 326 62.45%
254 87.89% 114 39.45% 175 60.55%
371 83.56% 167 37.61% 277 62.39%
325 82.28% 137 34.68% 258 65.32%
142 83.04% 68 39.77% 103 60.23%
150 81.52% 73 39.67% 111 60.33%
26 83.87% 19 61.29% 12 38.71%
172 90.05% 93 48.69% 98 51.31%
389 86.83% 187 41.74% 261 58.26%
815 88.20% 441 47.73% 483 52.27%
329 93.20% 120 33.99% 233 66.01%
229 79.51% 134 46.53% 154 53.47%
662 75.74% 148 16.93% 726 83.07%
314 84.41% 89 23.92% 283 76.08%
2 50.00% 0 0.00% 4 100.00%
59 92.19% 26 40.63% 38 59.38%
121 92.37% 42 32.06% 89 67.94%
9 81.82% 7 63.64% 4 36.36%
6 100.00% 2 33.33% 4 66.67%
404 82.28% 182 37.07% 309 62.93%
78 100.00% 21 26.92% 57 73.08%
6 100.00% 4 66.67% 2 33.33%
145 88.96% 46 28.22% 117 71.78%
247 82.89% 100 33.56% 198 66.44%
683 77.00% 314 35.40% 573 64.60%
0 0.00% 1 100.00% 0 0.00%
1 100.00% 1 100.00% 0 0.00%
139 82.74% 62 36.90% 106 63.10%
6 100.00% 4 66.67% 2 33.33%
6 100.00% 2 33.33% 4 66.67%
3 100.00% 0 0.00% 3 100.00%
290 96.67% 75 25.00% 225 75.00%
152 83.06% 92 50.27% 91 49.73%
31 96.88% 12 37.50% 20 62.50%
5 100.00% 4 80.00% 1 20.00%
523 84.22% 221 35.59% 400 64.41%
21 100.00% 13 61.90% 8 38.10%
3 100.00% 0 0.00% 3 100.00%
2938 84.30% 1231 35.32% 2254 64.68%
nt, acquirer industry, and acquirer country for the full sample, for the subsamples of
stry-diversifying and industry-focused M&As.
nership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
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T2  T1 þ 1
p
For a sample of N events, the test statistic (t) that examines the null









Table 1 provides an overview of our study’s dependent and test
variables, with their hypothesized sign on the industry-diversify-
ing nature of a firm’s M&As and on the abnormal returns for
acquirer shareholders at M&A announcement. Table 1 also reports
on our control variables because M&A decisions can be influenced
by many factors: firm financial strength, industry conditions, and
external governance characteristics. Hence, we specify our models
to also control for those forces. Because agency problems are likely
more severe when firms have plenty of cash that can be spent at
the discretion of managers or large shareholders, we include CASH
RATIO. Conversely, a high debt ratio (LEVERAGE) could reduce those
problems because it implies regular debt-service payments
(Jensen, 1986). In line with Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz,
2004, we expect conflicts of interest with managers to be more
serious in large listed firms (FIRM SIZE). In a similar vein, managers
of glamor acquirers (high M/B firms) are more likely to be infected
by hubris (e.g., Rau & Vermaelen, 1998; Roll, 1986). Managers who
overestimate their own capabilities could then pursue M&As in
unfamiliar industries. The incentives of managers and large
shareholders to reduce their firm’s risk may also depend upon
its current risk (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). We capture this idea by
means of the variables TOTAL RISK and CONGLOMERATE. Next, firms
in a low-growth or highly concentrated industry may opt for an
industry-diversifying M&A strategy (e.g., Huyghebaert & Luypaert,
2013; Powell & Yawson, 2005). Finally, we control for differences in
investor protection and disclosure standards across countries by
means of MARKETCAP_GDP (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1998). In countries with a stronger corporate governance
regime, as reflected by their superior stock market development, itTable 3
Ownership held by the acquirer’s largest shareholder.
Family-controlled acquirers 
Ownership bracket N Col% Cum
[5,10] 23 4.2% 4.2%
]10,15] 51 9.3% 13.5
]15,20] 55 10.1% 23.6
]20,25] 69 12.6% 36.2
]25,30] 47 8.6% 44.8
]30,35] 57 10.4% 55.2
]35,40] 20 3.7% 58.9
]40,45] 30 5.5% 64.4
]45,50] 26 4.7% 69.1
]50,55] 61 11.2% 80.3
]55,60] 17 3.1% 83.4
]60,65] 42 7.6% 91.0
]65,70] 13 2.4% 93.4
]70,75] 18 3.3% 96.7
]75,80] 7 1.3% 98.0
]80,85] 6 1.1% 99.1
]85,90] 5 0.9% 100
]90,95] 0 0.0% 100
]95,100] 0 0.0% 100
Total 547 100.0% 
Table 3 displays the distribution of the fraction of direct and indirect voting rights held b
the subsamples of family-controlled and non-family-controlled acquirers.
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investors.
3.3. Summary statistics
Table 2 displays the yearly, industry, and geographical
distribution for the full sample (Panel A) and for the subsamples
of M&As by family-controlled versus non-family-controlled
acquirers (Panel B) and for the subsamples of industry-diversifying
versus industry-focused M&As (Panel C). The 3485 M&As in our
sample were made by 1156 distinctive acquirers, whereas the 1231
industry-diversifying deals (35.3% of the sample) were pursued by
422 unique acquirers. Table 2 shows that every sample year has a
non-trivial number of M&As, with most deals occurring in the year
2007 (11.1% of the sample). Approximately half of the acquirers are
active in manufacturing or in personal and business services. The
geographical distribution of the acquirers is highly dispersed, with
a considerable fraction of acquirers domiciled in France (17.3%),
Sweden (12.1%), and Germany (9.6%).
For 547 sample deals (15.7% of the sample), we identify a family
as the largest acquirer shareholder, controlling at least 5% of the
firm’s voting rights. Most of the family-controlled acquirers in our
sample are active in personal and business services. The top three
countries in terms of M&As initiated by family-controlled firms are
France (204 deals; 23.0%), Sweden (98 deals; 15.8%), and Germany
(87 deals; 17.7%). The fraction of M&As initiated by family-
controlled acquirers in those countries is always larger than the
sample average of 15.7%.
Table 3 provides an overview of the ownership distribution for
the family-controlled and non-family-controlled acquirers in the
sample. All the CE listed acquirers in our sample have a single large
shareholder ultimately controlling at least 5% of voting rights. The
table further reveals that family ownership is 20% or less for 23.6%
of family firms. Notably, 19.7% of family firms have majority family
ownership, indicating considerable cross-sectional variation in
family ownership across the family-controlled acquirers in our
sample. In contrast, Cannella et al. (2015) emphasize that minority
family ownership is the rule in US listed family firms. Finally, we
observe a similarly high variation in ownership stakes for the non-
family-controlled acquirers in our sample.Non-family-controlled acquirers
ul% N Col% Cumul%
 368 12.5% 12.5%
% 378 12.9% 25.4%
% 244 8.3% 33.7%
% 263 9.0% 42.7%
% 239 8.1% 50.8%
% 234 8.0% 58.8%
% 156 5.3% 64.1%
% 173 5.9% 70.0%
% 158 5.4% 75.4%
% 189 6.4% 81.8%
% 104 3.5% 85.3%
% 129 4.4% 89.7%
% 90 3.1% 92.8%
% 68 2.3% 95.1%
% 24 0.8% 95.9%
% 41 1.4% 97.3%
.0% 39 1.3% 98.6%
.0% 12 0.4% 99.0%
.0% 29 1.0% 100.0%
2938 100.0%
y the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder over various voting-rights brackets for
nership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
Table 4
Acquirer abnormal returns for different event windows.
Event window
[1,+1] [5,+5] [35,+5]
Panel A: Full sample
Averages
CAR% 0.9671*** 0.8013*** 0.6334**
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175
Medians
CAR% 0.3750*** 0.3918*** 0.0644***
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: Family-controlled versus non-family-controlled acquirers
Family-controlled acquirers
Averages
CAR% 1.1586*** 0.6227 0.9048
p-value 0.0000 0.1436 0.2114
Non-family-controlled acquirers
Averages
CAR% 0.9314*** 0.8346*** 0.5829*
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0417
Comparison of family-controlled and non-family-controlled acquirers (difference in means)
Averages
DCAR% 0.2272 0.2119 0.3219
p-value 0.3528 0.6251 0.6605
Panel C: Industry-diversifying versus industry-focused M&As
Industry-diversifying M&As
Averages
CAR% 0.6991*** 0.4866* 0.3574
p-value 0.0000 0.0791 0.4406
Industry-focused M&As
Averages
CAR% 1.1130*** 0.9727*** 0.7838**
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160
Comparison of industry-diversifying and industry-focused M&As (difference in means)
Averages
DCAR% 0.4139** 0.4861 0.4263
p-value 0.0262 0.1408 0.4447
This table presents the acquirer CAR over different event windows. The significance of the average acquirer CAR is tested by means of the Dodd and Warner (1983) parametric
test. The significance of the median acquirer CAR is tested by means of the non-parametric Corrado test. CARs significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and
***, respectively.
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different event windows. The largest acquirer stock price reaction
takes place in the [-1,+1] event window, with a significant
abnormal price jump of 0.97% on average for the full sample
(p  0.01). Over the [5,+5] event window, acquirer shareholders
realize a significant average CAR of 0.80% (p  0.01). The average
CAR is also significantly positive over the [35,+5] event window
(p  0.05). Median acquirer CARs are lower but still highly
significant. Arguably, the above numbers indicate that stock
market investors perceive M&As by listed acquirers in Continental
Europe in the 2005–2013 time frame to create shareholder value
on average. When comparing the family-controlled and non-
family-controlled subsamples in Panel B, we detect an average
acquirer CAR of 1.16% over the [1,+1] event window for the family-
controlled acquirers, which is not significantly different from the
0.93% for non-family-controlled acquirers. This outcome also
arises for the other event windows. When comparing the industry-
diversifying and industry-focused subsamples in Panel C, we note
that the average acquirer CAR equals a significant 0.70% for
conglomerate M&As over the [-1,+1] window, whereas it equals a
significantly larger 1.11% for related M&As. This conclusion also
emerges from the other event windows; however, the difference inPlease cite this article in press as: C. Defrancq, et al., Influence of family ow
Empirical evidence from Continental Europe, Journal of Family Businesaverage acquirer CAR is no longer statistically significant at the 10%
level.
Fig. 1 depicts the average acquirer CAR surrounding the M&A
announcement date. Before deal notification, the average acquirer
CAR is slightly negative but close to zero. At M&A announcement, it
exhibits a significant upward jump. This pattern is highly
comparable to that found by Martynova and Renneboog (2011,
p. 232), who analyze 2419 M&As taking place in Europe between
1993 and 2001.
Table 5 reports summary statistics for all the continuous
explanatory variables, which, unless stated otherwise, are mea-
sured at fiscal year-end before M&A announcement to avoid
reverse causality problems. To limit the influence of outliers, all the
variables  except the dummy variables  are winsorized at
1%  99%. Table 5, Panel A shows that the average voting-rights
stake of the acquirer’s largest ultimate shareholder equals 34.3%
(median BLOCK of 30.0%). It differs significantly across the family-
controlled (36.6%) and other (33.8%) acquirers in Panel B. Family-
controlled acquirers also have a significantly larger CASH RATIO
(12.7%) but lower LEVERAGE (12.0%) than their non-family-
controlled counterparts. Their FIRM SIZE is also significantly
smaller. The average acquirer M/B equals 2.74 but is not hugelynership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
Fig. 1. Acquirer abnormal returns surrounding the M&A announcement date.
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for acquirer shareholders to the announcement of an M&A from 35 days before to 5 days after the deal announcement
date (day 0). The benchmark used in the market model is the MscI Europe index; the model parameters are estimated over 200 days, starting 250 days before the event date.
10 C. Defrancq et al. / Journal of Family Business Strategy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
G Model
JFBS 204 No. of Pages 17affected by the identity of the firm’s largest shareholder. Likewise,
TOTAL RISK of family firms (0.57) is only smaller based upon the
non-parametric test. Family-controlled acquirers are active in 1.98
three-digit US SIC industries on average. IND. GROWTH is largely
comparable across the two subsamples. However, IND. CONC, i.e.,
the average Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index in theTable 5
Summary statistics on the explanatory variables.
Variable N Mean Median Std.dev N Me
Panel A: Full sample
BLOCK 3485 0.3429 0.3000 0.2179
CASH RATIO 3273 0.1134 0.0772 0.1133
LEVERAGE 3180 0.1354 0.1122 0.1236
FIRM SIZE 3291 13.3463 13.2550 2.3107
M/B 3304 2.7439 2.2000 2.1037
TOTAL RISK 3398 0.5969 0.3356 0.6853
CONGLOMERATE 3485 2.4850 2.0000 1.8209
IND. GROWTH 3055 0.0578 0.0653 0.0879
IND. CONC 3180 0.1927 0.1170 0.1913
MARKETCAP_GDP 3485 0.7817 0.7560 0.3440
Panel B: Family-controlled versus non-family-controlled acquirers
Family-controlled acquirers Non-family-c
BLOCK 547 0.3659 0.3052 0.1986 2938 0.3
CASH RATIO 527 0.1271 0.0992 0.2263 2746 0.11
LEVERAGE 525 0.1204 0.0898 0.1142 2655 0.13
FIRM SIZE 527 12.7343 12.5151 2.1859 2764 13.4
M/B 521 2.8130 2.3300 1.9727 2783 2.7
TOTAL RISK 527 0.5671 0.3169 0.6181 2871 0.6
CONGLOMERATE 547 1.9762 2.0000 1.2599 2938 2.5
IND. GROWTH 494 0.0531 0.0647 0.0797 2561 0.0
IND. CONC 508 0.1507 0.0938 0.1687 2672 0.2
MARKETCAP_GDP 547 0.7961 0.7584 0.3394 2938 0.7
Panel C: Industry-diversifying versus industry-focused M&As
Industry-diversifying M&As Industry-focu
BLOCK 1231 0.3638 0.3170 0.2249 2254 0.3
CASH RATIO 1149 0.1020 0.0676 0.1033 2124 0.11
LEVERAGE 1124 0.1430 0.1154 0.1295 2056 0.13
FIRM SIZE 1157 13.4653 13.4469 2.3655 2134 13.2
M/B 1152 2.6024 2.1100 2.0202 2152 2.8
TOTAL RISK 1204 0.6381 0.3482 0.7245 2194 0.5
CONGLOMERATE 1231 2.4890 2.0000 1.8345 2254 2.4
IND. GROWTH 1039 0.0568 0.0647 0.0989 2016 0.0
IND. CONC 1102 0.2425 0.1774 0.2166 2016 0.16
MARKETCAP_GDP 1231 0.7548 0.7528 0.3585 2254 0.7
Table 5 reports summary statistics on the explanatory variables for the full sample, for th
subsamples of industry-diversifying and industry-focused M&As. Table 1 presents defin
parametric and non-parametric comparison test.
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controlled acquirers (15.1%). Finally, MARKETCAP_GDP, measuring
the total market cap relative to GDP in the acquirer country,
suggests that family firms are equally represented in countries
with a more versus less developed stock market.an Median Std.dev p-value on t-test p-value on Wilcoxon test
ontrolled acquirers
386 0.2968 0.2210 0.0071 0.0001
08 0.0735 0.1125 0.0026 0.0000
84 0.1153 0.1251 0.0023 0.0067
630 13.4469 2.3158 0.0000 0.0000
309 2.1800 2.1274 0.4141 0.0867
023 0.3376 0.6969 0.2783 0.0926
442 2.0000 1.8941 0.0000 0.0000
587 0.0655 0.0893 0.1931 0.0863
007 0.1282 0.1943 0.0000 0.0000
790 0.7560 0.3448 0.2858 0.2757
sed M&As
315 0.2900 0.2131 0.0000 0.0001
96 0.0823 0.1179 0.0000 0.0000
12 0.1103 0.1200 0.0100 0.0249
818 13.1792 2.2784 0.0295 0.0140
196 2.2700 2.1437 0.0047 0.0015
742 0.3277 0.6618 0.0093 0.0046
366 2.0000 1.8136 0.4162 0.3013
583 0.0653 0.0816 0.6569 0.8481
63 0.0975 0.1706 0.0000 0.0000
964 0.7584 0.3349 0.0006 0.0001
e subsamples of family-controlled and non-family-controlled acquirers, and for the
itions of all the variables. The last two columns show the p-values of a two-group
nership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
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diversifying M&As have a significantly larger controlling share-
holder (average BLOCK of 36.4%) than acquirers engaging in
industry-focused M&As (33.2%). Additionally, they have a signifi-
cantly smaller CASH RATIO (10.2%), higher LEVERAGE (14.3%), a
larger FIRM SIZE, a smaller market-to-book ratio (2.60), and larger
TOTAL RISK (0.64). However, they do not differ in terms of
CONGLOMERATE and IND. GROWTH, although acquirers pursuing
industry diversification are active in more highly concentrated
industries (24.3%). MARKETCAP_GDP also differs significantly
across the two subsamples, thereby indicating that conglomerate
M&As are initiated to a larger extent by acquirers located in a
country with a less developed stock market. The correlation
matrix, which is in the Appendix A, reveals relatively small
correlations among the explanatory variables shown in Table 5.
4. Empirical findings
In the first part of this section, we examine how family
ownership influences the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s
M&A strategy by means of a logistic regression model. This
methodology is appropriate when the dependent variable can take
on one of only two possible values. In our study, DIVERSIFICATION is
a binary variable that equals one for conglomerate M&As and zero
otherwise. Next, we present results as to the impact of family
ownership on acquirer shareholder value effects from the eventTable 6
Explaining the incidence of industry diversification in M&As.
Panel A: Family versus non-family firms Panel B: Family versus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FAM5 0.2687 1.0659*** 0.1689 1.0425*













CASH RATIO 0.9782* 0.9341 0.9064 0.8176 0.7134 
(0.0878) (0.1053) (0.1184) (0.4645) (0.5441) 
LEVERAGE 0.2014 0.1522 0.2930 2.1816* 1.8149 
(0.6973) (0.7691) (0.5669) (0.0703) (0.1283) 
FIRM SIZE 0.0332 0.0364 0.0418 0.0064 0.0077 
(0.2752) (0.2401) (0.1733) (0.9423) (0.9385) 
M/B 0.0665** 0.0736** 0.0770** 0.1391** 0.1786*
(0.0275) (0.0172) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0046)
TOTAL RISK 0.2216*** 0.2189*** 0.2085** 0.1906 0.1937 
(0.0075) (0.0091) (0.0127) (0.3198) (0.3546) 
CONGLOMERATE 0.0144 0.0167 0.0191 0.0739 0.0549 
(0.6367) (0.5867) (0.5246) (0.5276) (0.6839)
IND. GROWTH 0.5425 0.5222 0.6038 1.1440 1.2228 
(0.3397) (0.3570) (0.2955) (0.4318) (0.3918) 
IND. CONC 2.0202*** 1.9976*** 2.0039*** 3.1052*** 3.0268**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
MARKETCAP_GDP 0.3370* 0.3079* 0.2410 0.1317 0.0092 
(0.0635) (0.0879) (0.1827) (0.7494) (0.9822) 
Constant 0.9442** 0.9917** 0.8642** 0.7075 0.8634
(0.0217) (0.0177) (0.0408) (0.4990) (0.4624) 
Observations 2574 2574 2574 535 535 
Nagelkerke R2 0.0725 0.0795 0.0856 0.1001 0.1336 
Maximum VIF 1.29 3.96 1.79 1.31 1.96 
Table 6 shows the logistic regression results as to the incidence of industry diversification 
family firms to lone-founder firms and Panel C compares family firms to non-family non-
their hypothesized effects on DIVERSIFICATION. All the control variables are measured at t
Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***, resp
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the robustness of our results to alternative model specifications.
4.1. Impact of family ownership on industry diversification
Table 6 displays the output from the logistic regression analysis
predicting the probability that DIVERSIFICATION equals one, given
the values of the explanatory variables. While Panel A shows the
results for the full sample, Panels B and C compare family firms to
lone-founder firms and to non-family non-lone-founder firms,
respectively. For each set of analyses, we first add the dummy
variable FAM5 to explore whether a firm’s M&A strategy differs
across family and non-family firms (model 1). In model 2, we then
investigate in more detail the influence of family ownership given
that a firm is family-controlled, by means of the continuous
variable FAMBLOCK. Finally, model 3 relies on a non-monotonic
model specification, by means of the dummy variables FAM5_20,
FAM20_50, and FAM50_100. In this model, we also control for the
ownership stake of other, i.e., non-family large shareholders in
non-family-controlled firms by means of OTHER5_20 and OTH-
ER20_50. Because all sample firms have a single large shareholder
controlling at least 5% of voting rights, the reference category for
model 3 thus represents the acquirers with a non-family majority
shareholder (OTHER50_100 = 1).
Next, all the models include firm-specific (CASH RATIO,
LEVERAGE, FIRM SIZE, M/B, TOTAL RISK, and CONGLOMERATE), lone-founder firms Panel C: Family versus non-family non-lone-founder firms















0.5809 1.1934** 1.1454* 1.1084*
(0.6228) (0.0481) (0.0594) (0.0697)
1.7930 0.2468 0.1965 0.3353
(0.1471) (0.6392) (0.7093) (0.5191)
0.0052 0.0334 0.0369 0.0426
(0.9575) (0.2899) (0.2501) (0.1797)
** 0.1861*** 0.0669** 0.0747** 0.0778**
 (0.0051) (0.0337) (0.0212) (0.0140)
0.2203 0.2206*** 0.2180** 0.2063**
(0.2678) (0.0093) (0.0111) (0.0157)
0.0772 0.0157 0.0181 0.0203
 (0.5841) (0.6058) (0.5574) (0.4994)
1.1597 0.6788 0.6585 0.7415
(0.4161) (0.2334) (0.2467) (0.2005)
* 2.9761*** 1.9298*** 1.9045*** 1.9166***
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
0.0404 0.3335* 0.3014 0.2321
(0.9205) (0.0740) (0.1042) (0.2125)
 0.6384 0.8862** 0.9408** 0.8247*
(0.6056) (0.0418) (0.0340) (0.0638)
535 2475 2475 2475
0.1397 0.0715 0.0787 0.0849
8.68 1.28 3.94 1.78
in M&As. Panel A compares family firms to non-family firms, while Panel B compares
lone-founder firms. Table 1 presents definitions of all the explanatory variables and
he prior fiscal year-end before M&A announcement and are winsorized at 1%  99%.
ectively. p-values are reported in parentheses.
nership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
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specific (MARKETCAP_GDP) control variables. The results prove
robust once the industry-level control variables are replaced by
industry and year fixed effects (not reported in a table). The results
also remain valid after substituting MARKETCAP_ GDP by country
and year fixed effects. The maximum variance inflation factor (VIF)
of each model, which is reported at the bottom of Table 6, never
exceeds ten and hence suggests no multicollinearity problems
(Lomax, 1992).
Table 6, Panel A reveals that for firms engaging in M&As, the
presence of a large family shareholder (FAM5 = 1) negatively affects
the incidence of industry diversification but only significantly so in
model 2 (p  0.01). In contrast, the stake of the firm’s family
shareholder (FAMBLOCK) has a significant positive effect (p  0.01
in model 2). From these two pieces of evidence, we infer that
family-controlled acquirers are generally less inclined to pursue
conglomerate M&As but are willing to abandon that M&A strategy
as the size of family’s ownership stake increases.9 To further
validate this latter outcome, we now turn to the results of model 3.
Acquirers with a family shareholder controlling either 5% to 20% or
20% to 50% of voting rights are less likely to buy an unrelated target
firm than acquirers with a non-family majority shareholder. The
coefficient on FAM50_100 is not significant, thereby indicating that
firms with a majority owner adhere to a similar industry-
diversifying M&A strategy, regardless of the identity of their
largest shareholder. Notably, the parameter estimate on FAM5_20
is more negative than that on FAM20_50, which is in line with our
earlier-detected linear relation (model 2). Finally, OTHER5_20 also
has a negative and significant coefficient; however, its effect is far
smaller than that on FAM5_20.10 We can thus also infer that
acquirers controlled by a family with a non-majority stake are least
likely to pursue industry diversification when engaging in M&As.
The results from a robustness check  which is not shown in
Table 6–reveal that a quadratic term in family ownership, added to
either model 2 or model 3, is never significant, thereby confirming
once more that the family ownership effect is linear in nature.
Arguably, our findings provide strong empirical support for
Hypothesis 1a, arguing that families with a non-trivial but non-
dominant ownership stake induce their firms to adopt a highly
focused M&A strategy, which is more likely to add to shareholder
value. We find that those effects arise uniquely for non-majority
levels of family ownership. Therefore, families with a non-majority
stake prove able to curb the P–A conflict with management in
M&As because of their stricter monitoring of managers and/or
because of their well-aligned incentives with the firm’s minority
investors. However, as the family’s ownership stake increases to
above 50%, a P–P conflict with minority investors ensues, thereby
offsetting the earlier-obtained beneficial family effects. Rather
than focusing on shareholder value maximization, families with
majority ownership now induce their firms to embrace an M&A
strategy that accomplishes another, i.e., family-related objective. In
this study, we find that those family firms have a preference for
conglomerate M&As, which can help diversify the family wealth.
Our findings thus also provide strong empirical support for
Hypothesis 2a. Overall, our results are not consistent with earlier
findings by Anderson & Reeb (2003a) and Gomez-Mejia et al.
(2010). While our findings, despite our reliance on divergent
definitions of M&As and diversification, are more in line with those9 When computing marginal effects based upon model 2, we find that family-
controlled acquirers are 7.10% less likely to engage in industry-diversifying M&As
than non-family firms. The marginal effect of the variable FAMBLOCK amounts to
20.49%. Both variables are thus also economically significant.
10 We performed a Chi2-test to examine whether FAM5_20 = FAM20_50, FAM5_20 =
OTHER5_20, and FAM20_50 = OTHER20_50. This test resulted in a rejection of the
null hypotheses, with p < 0.01.
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by showing an intrinsic preference of family-controlled firms for
industry-focused M&As, which is only abandoned when the family
controls a majority of the firm’s voting rights.
Next, our findings as to family ownership in Panels B and C of
Table 6 are highly comparable to those in Panel A. The weaker
statistical significance of some of the relations in Panel B is
probably due to the reduced sample size in that panel; the
parameter estimates are indeed still highly comparable. We
therefore infer that the most important categorization of acquirers
as to the industry-diversifying nature of their M&A strategy is that
into family-controlled versus non-family-controlled firms. Accord-
ingly, and in line with our theoretical arguments, lone-founder
firms are much more akin to other types of non-family businesses
than to family firms in reference to the industry-diversifying
nature of their M&As. In sum, while prior research has shown that
firm performance/value differs significantly across family firms
and lone-founder firms (e.g., Miller et al., 2007), our study is the
first to show that they also embrace a divergent M&A strategy.
As regards the firm-level control variables, we find that CASH
RATIO and LEVERAGE are not significant in Panel A of Table 6. If
anything, the borderline-significant negative coefficient on CASH
RATIO, which also appears in Panel C, indicates that cash-rich listed
firms in Continental Europe are less inclined to diversify their
operations when engaging in M&As. FIRM SIZE is never significant
 not even borderline. The acquirer market-to-book ratio shows a
negative and significant association with DIVERSIFICATION in all
the panels. Acquirers that are valued more highly by stock market
investors thus tend to engage less in industry-diversifying M&As.
Possibly, these firms still have access to many valuable growth
opportunities in their own industry and, hence, do not aim to
invest across industry boundaries. TOTAL RISK is significantly
positive, but only in Panels A and C. Acquirers with a more volatile
business thus choose more often to diversify their operations when
buying another company. In contrast, CONGLOMERATE is never
significant.
Of the industry-level control variables, IND. GROWTH is never
significant. In contrast, IND. CONC proves highly significant in all
models (p  0.01). So, CE listed firms active in a highly concentrated
industry prefer takeover targets active in another industry.
Possibly, firms in those industries are pushed outside their own
when pursuing growth via M&As (see also Huyghebaert &
Luypaert, 2010).
MARKETCAP_GDP, if significant, has a negative coefficient. If
anything, acquirers in countries with a more developed stock
market thus tend to diversify less. Because stock market
development is associated with better investor protection and
more stringent disclosure standards, this finding could indicate
that firm managers and large shareholders find it more difficult or
costly to expropriate minority investors by means of their firm’s
M&A policy if their country’s corporate governance regime is
stricter. Nonetheless, we also emphasize that the explanatory
power of this variable, which proved highly significant in the
univariate analysis, is far smaller in the multivariate analyses. From
this outcome, we infer that firm-level attributes  and a firm’s
ownership structure in particular  are much more influential than
this country-level corporate governance indicator to explain the
nature of a firm’s M&As.
4.2. Impact of family ownership on the abnormal returns for acquirer
shareholders
Table 7 reports the OLS regression results modeling the acquirer
CAR over the [1,+1] event window. This table has the same
structure as Table 6, except that we now also includenership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
Table 7
Explaining the acquirer shareholder abnormal returns at M&A announcement.
Panel A: Family versus non-family firms Panel B: Family versus lone-founder
firms
Panel C: Family versus non-family non-lone-
founder firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DIVERSIFICATION 0.0053** 0.0053** 0.0051** 0.0003 0.0010 0.0006 0.0056** 0.0057*** 0.0054**
(0.0219) (0.0175) (0.0288) (0.9900) (0.9357) (0.9776) (0.0109) (0.0081) (0.0141)
DIVERSIFICATION * FAM5 0.0086* 0.0036 0.0089*
(0.0961) (0.8595) (0.0867)
FAM5 0.0020 0.0134 0.0010
(0.4895) (0.2859) (0.7410)
DIVERSIFICATION * FAMBLOCK 0.0225* 0.0169 0.0229*
(0.0610) (0.5403) (0.0564)
FAMBLOCK 0.0076 0.0238 0.0052
(0.3024) (0.1418) (0.4690)
DIVERSIFICATION * FAM5_20 0.0026 0.0057 0.0033
(0.7521) (0.8044) (0.6913)
FAM5_20 0.0061 0.0029 0.0068
(0.2453) (0.8653) (0.1965)
DIVERSIFICATION * FAM20_50 0.0095 0.0035 0.0100
(0.1760) (0.8687) (0.1493)
FAM20_50 0.0019 0.0090 0.0014
(0.5985) (0.5956) (0.7034)
DIVERSIFICATION * FAM50_100 0.0133 0.0087 0.0137
(0.1205) (0.6868) (0.1115)
FAM50_100 0.0013 0.0110 0.0006
(0.8140) (0.5206) (0.9120)
OTHER5_20 0.0042 0.0118 0.0034
(0.1196) (0.5028) (0.1944)
OTHER20_50 0.0027 0.0025 0.0022
(0.3298) (0.9204) (0.3753)
CASH RATIO 0.0193* 0.0194* 0.0197* 0.0108 0.0110 0.0098 0.0248** 0.0249** 0.0253**
(0.0598) (0.0586) (0.0545) (0.6515) (0.6506) (0.6786) (0.0171) (0.0168) (0.0148)
LEVERAGE 0.0099 0.0097 0.0112 0.0006 0.0004 0.0000 0.0113 0.0111 0.0123
(0.3361) (0.3444) (0.2819) (0.9783) (0.9844) (0.9999) (0.2749) (0.2808) (0.2398)
FIRM SIZE 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0031*** 0.0037** 0.0041** 0.0038** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0234) (0.0204) (0.0143) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
M/B 0.0013** 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0013** 0.0012** 0.0012**
(0.0159) (0.0171) (0.0193) (0.6899) (0.8586) (0.7921) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0174)
TOTAL RISK 0.0027 0.0027 0.0026 0.0004 0.0006 0.0009 0.0031* 0.0031* 0.0030
(0.1611) (0.1622) (0.1862) (0.9298) (0.9013) (0.8452) (0.0927) (0.0932) (0.1092)
CONGLOMERATE 0.0005 0.0099 0.0004 0.0014 0.0220 0.0014 0.0004 0.0131 0.0004
(0.2839) (0.3379) (0.3260) (0.4491) (0.4854) (0.4616) (0.3755) (0.1922) (0.4111)
IND. GROWTH 0.0100 0.0025 0.0107 0.0228 0.0016 0.0235 0.0131 0.0026 0.0137
(0.3337) (0.5651) (0.3053) (0.4634) (0.8971) (0.4322) (0.1896) (0.5325) (0.1755)
IND. CONC 0.0026 0.0005 0.0025 0.0034 0.0016 0.0014 0.0026 0.0004 0.0027
(0.5497) (0.2691) (0.5550) (0.7879) (0.3693) (0.9104) (0.5259) (0.3480) (0.5233)
MARKETCAP_GDP 0.0012 0.0011 0.0004 0.0041 0.0011 0.0033 0.0020 0.0020 0.0013
(0.7150) (0.7288) (0.9098) (0.5827) (0.8864) (0.6607) (0.5066) (0.5138) (0.6629)
Constant 0.0567*** 0.0568*** 0.0549*** 0.0667* 0.0680* 0.0621* 0.0507*** 0.0508*** 0.0492***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0664) (0.0512) (0.0555) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 2565 2565 2565 535 535 535 2466 2466 2466
Adjusted R2 0.0267 0.0270 0.0284 0.0333 0.0330 0.0364 0.0286 0.0290 0.0305
Maximum VIF 1.54 1.68 1.83 5.45 3.59 9.84 1.55 1.69 1.84
Table 7 shows the OLS regression results as to the acquirer CAR over the [-1,+1] window. Panel A compares family firms to non-family firms, while Panel B compares family
firms to lone-founder firms and Panel C compares family firms to non-family non-lone-founder firms. Table 1 presents definitions of all the explanatory variables and their
hypothesized effects on CAR. All the control variables are measured at fiscal year-end before M&A announcement and are winsorized at 1%  99%. Coefficients significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***, respectively. p-values are reported in parentheses.
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ownership variables.
Table 7, Panel A reveals that acquirers embracing an industry-
diversifying M&A strategy realize a significantly lower CAR
(p  0.05 in models 1–3). This finding supports the idea that those
conglomerate deals are to the detriment of the firm’s minority
investors. However, from the parameter estimate (-0.53% in
models 1 and 2), we cannot conclude that those deals are
perceived to destroy shareholder value on average; they only do
not create as much value as the average transaction in the sample,
which is 0.97% over the [1,+1] event window. Next, the
interaction term DIVERSIFICATION * FAM5 is significant in model
1 (p  0.1); from its coefficient, we infer that the presence of a large
family shareholder fully reverses the negative impact ofPlease cite this article in press as: C. Defrancq, et al., Influence of family ow
Empirical evidence from Continental Europe, Journal of Family BusinesDIVERSIFICATION on the acquirer CAR. Arguably, and considering
that family firms with non-majority family ownership are less
likely to pursue conglomerate M&As (as revealed in Table 6), the
above findings are in line with the earlier-documented non-linear
relation between family ownership and firm value/performance in
European listed firms (e.g., Kowalewski et al., 2009; Maury, 2006;
Poutziouris et al., 2015).
Next, the results of model 2 indicate that the mitigating effect of
family ownership for the negative relation between DIVERSIFICA-
TION and the acquirer CAR is linear in nature. Put otherwise, this
negative effect tends to be weaker when the family controls a
larger fraction of the firm’s voting rights. This relation also arises in
model 3, which accounts for any interaction effects by means of
DIVERSIFICATION * FAMx_y. In line with our earlier findings innership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
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largest magnitude, although it is not significant at the 10% level
(p = 0.12). Arguably, we thus find no confirmation for the idea that
the conglomerate M&As made by family firms are to the detriment
of the firm’s minority investors. As regards the support for
Hypothesis 1b, we consider the above evidence to be only indirect
at best. Indeed, family firms with non-majority family ownership
are far less likely to engage in conglomerate M&As, which do not
create as much shareholder value on average. As to Hypothesis 2b,
our results allow us to refute that hypothesis because the sum of
the coefficients on DIVERSIFICATION and DIVERSIFICATION *
FAM50_100 is not different from zero. Possibly, families with
majority ownership keep in mind that excessive minority-investor
expropriation could harm the reputation of the family firm and the
family name; those reputation effects might therefore introduce a
self-imposed constraint on the level of minority-investor expro-
priation in which large families are willing to engage. Alternatively,
the magnitude of the family financial wealth at stake could impose
discipline on family firms.
Finally, FAM5 itself is not significant in model 1. FAMBLOCK and
the FAMx_y dummies are not significant in models 2 or 3. The mere
fact that an acquirer is controlled by a large family shareholder
thus has no effect on acquirer shareholder value on top of its effect
via the industry-diversifying nature of the firm’s M&A strategy.
This same conclusion arises from examining the role of the
ownership stake held by this large family shareholder.
The results as to the effects of DIVERSIFICATION and family
ownership in Panels B and C of Table 7 indicate that the most
important split is that between family-controlled firms and non-
family non-lone-founder firms. Indeed, because none of our test
variables is significant in Panel B, we conclude that family firms are
more comparable to lone-founder firms than to non-family non-
lone founder firms when seeking to explain the shareholder value
creation in M&As. This conclusion is in line with earlier findings by
Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010), who show that the
abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders upon deal announce-
ment do not differ significantly across family firms and lone-
founder firms.
Analyzing the role of the control variables, we note that CASH
RATIO is significantly negative in Panels A and C of Table 7. A
negative coefficient is consistent with the findings of Harford
(1999), who argues that it reflects an agency problem. From the
size of the parameter estimates, we infer that stock market
investors in Continental Europe perceive this conflict to destroy
shareholder value on average. However, our results as to the
impact of CASH RATIO on DIVERSIFICATION in Table 6 reveal that
such value destruction does not predominantly come from cash-
rich acquirers buying a target firm in another industry. Table 6
indeed indicates that CASH RATIO, if significant, is negatively related
to the odds of a conglomerate deal.
Next, LEVERAGE is never significant. FIRM SIZE has a significant
negative impact in all the models, in line with Moeller et al. (2004).
The latter authors contend that the incentives of managers in
smaller listed firms are better aligned with those of shareholders
than is the case in large listed firms. Moreover, managers in large
listed firms could be more prone to hubris. The acquirer M/B ratio is
significantly negative in Panels A and C, which indicates that stock
market investors are concerned about managers over-extrapolat-
ing past performance when subsequently engaging in M&As (see
also Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). TOTAL RISK also has a negative sign
but is only borderline significant in Panel C. All the other control
variables, i.e., CONGLOMERATE, IND. GROWTH, IND. CONC, and
MARKETCAP_GDP, have no significant effect on the abnormal
returns for acquirer shareholders at deal announcement. The
models’ maximum VIF, at the bottom of Table 7, never indicate a
multicollinearity problem.Please cite this article in press as: C. Defrancq, et al., Influence of family ow
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To assess the robustness of our findings, we perform a number
of additional tests. First, we re-run all the models with the dummy
DIVERSIFICATION defined at the four-digit US SIC level. The results
of these extra tests are generally consistent with those shown in
Table 6. Robustness also emerges when DIVERSIFICATION is defined
in a more categorical way. To that end, we set it equal to one when
the acquirer and the target firm share no two-digit US SIC code and
equal to 0.75 (0.5) when none of their three-(four-)digit US SIC
codes overlap. Alternatively, we re-examine the results as to the
acquirer CAR when using the other event windows to compute CAR,
particularly the [5,+5] and [35,+5] windows. For those longer
event windows, the parameter estimates on DIVERSIFICATION and
its interaction with family ownership point in the same direction
as in Table 7 but do not always meet the 10% threshold for
statistical significance. Running the models with other thresholds
to distinguish between non-dominant and dominant family
ownership does not generate any new insights. In fact, the 20%
and 50% cutoffs prove most informative because they result in
models with the highest Nagelkerke R-square. Next, adding extra
control variables in the CAR regressions, such as relative deal size, a
dummy that equals one for cross-border M&As, and a dummy that
equals one for deals that are fully paid in acquirer shares, does not
add novel insights. Moreover, those variables are never significant
at the 10% level (see also Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo, 2010).
Because the data needed to compute those extra control variables
are not always available in Zephyr, we decided not to include them
in our main regression models of Table 7. Particularly the deal-
payment data are missing to a large extent (for 68.4% of sample
deals).
Next, we replace MARKETCAP_GDP with a number of other
country-level corporate governance indicators. To that end, we
make use of the RULE OF LAW variable from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011); it
captures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, police, and courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence. We also gather information on
the GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS index (Kaufmann et al., 2011).
Lastly, we consider the La Porta et al. (1998) rule-of-law variable.
Including those alternative country-level governance variables
does not alter our conclusions as to the variables of interest.
However, those country-level governance indicators now also
become significantly positively related to the acquirer CAR in some
of the models in Table 7. We next run a robustness check after
splitting the sample into M&As initiated by acquirers operating
under the French, Scandinavian, and German civil-law legal
system. We infer that the relations between family ownership
and DIVERSIFICATION are not unique to one of these subsamples.
Finally, we investigate the robustness of our findings within the
subsample of family-controlled acquirers (FAM5 = 1). We again find
that the fraction of voting rights controlled by a firm’s family bears
a positive and significant influence on that firm’s propensity to
initiate an industry-diversifying M&A. Next, and in line with the
results in Panel B of Table 7, we infer that DIVERSIFICATION is never
significantly related to the acquirer shareholder value effects
within this subsample. We therefore conclude once more that
especially the comparison of family firms and non-family non-
lone-founder firms matters in explaining the acquirer CAR.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The starting point of our study was the non-linear relation
between family ownership and the performance/value of listed
companies in Europe (e.g., Kowalewski et al., 2009; Maury, 2006;nership on the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy:
s Strategy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.11.002
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one specific channel, that is, the influence of family ownership on
the industry-diversifying nature of a firm’s M&A strategy. We
examined this topic for a large sample of 3485 M&As made by
listed acquirers in Continental Europe. The cross-sectional varia-
tion in family ownership across the listed firms in our sample
proved extensive, which allowed us to implement the type of
analyses that arose from our integrated P–A and P–P theoretical
frameworks.
First, we find that family ownership has a negative effect on the
odds that a family-controlled firm will initiate an industry-
diversifying M&A, provided that the family stake is 50% or less. Our
results are thus in line with the existence of a positive monitoring
and/or incentive-alignment effect at non-majority levels of family
ownership. For stakes above 50%, families no longer induce their
firm to pursue an industry-focused M&A strategy. Rather, their
stake now proves large enough to push the family business to
M&As that allow safeguarding the family’s financial and socio-
emotional wealth. We therefore conclude that an expropriation
effect ensues when the family becomes too dominant, thereby
neutralizing the earlier-detected positive family effect. However,
family firms with majority family ownership are not more likely to
engage in conglomerate M&As than lone-founder and other types
of non-family firms.
Next, our analyses of acquirer shareholder value effects at deal
announcement engender extra insights. First, we show that
industry-diversifying M&As produce lower abnormal returns on
average, which indicates that they are detrimental to the firm’s
minority investors. However, family control does not seem to
reinforce this negative effect of industry diversification on the
acquirer CAR. On the contrary, the conglomerate M&As pursued by
firms with majority family ownership produce an abnormal return
that is not significantly different from the sample average. Possibly,
families keep in mind that excessive minority-investor expropria-
tion could harm the reputation of the family firm and the family
name. Alternatively, the magnitude of the family financial wealth
at stake could impose discipline on the family firm. In aggregate,
our findings are in line with the earlier-detected non-linear
relation between family ownership and firm performance/value in
European listed firms.
The results in our article also clearly require reconsidering
earlier theoretical arguments that family firms may be reluctant to
diversify their business because doing so indirectly poses a hazard
to the family’s socioemotional wealth. Rather, and capitalizing on
the M&A literature, we argue that it is growth by itself that may
induce firms to raise extra financing and delegate responsibilities.
Future research should therefore also better disentangle the
influence of family ownership on company growth versus
company risk. Next, our findings indicate that family control can
help curtail the P–A conflict of interest with management at low,
i.e., non-majority levels of family ownership. In contrast, when the
family controls a majority of voting rights, family businesses no
longer focus uniquely on shareholder value maximization but
rather also adhere to other, familial goals, thereby provoking a P–P
conflict with the firm’s minority investors. Research on family
firms to date recognizes family businesses’ multiple goals; yet
another theoretical contribution that arises from our results is that
a family’s various objectives appear to receive different priorities
depending upon the family’s ownership stake. Finally, our study
shows that different types of large shareholders (‘principals’)
behave differently and therefore also endorses the recent directionPlease cite this article in press as: C. Defrancq, et al., Influence of family ow
Empirical evidence from Continental Europe, Journal of Family Businesin empirical family business research to separate true family firms
from lone-founder firms (e.g., Miller et al., 2007; Cannella et al.,
2015).
Future empirical research could examine the influence of family
ownership on other channels of shareholder value creation than a
firm’s M&A strategy to obtain a more complete understanding of
why and when family firms are valued more highly in the stock
market. Other researchers could also integrate the role of large
countervailing shareholders, like institutional investors, and how
they interact with the controlling family shareholder. Additionally,
future empirical research might wish to account for information on
top of the family firm’s ownership structure, for example whether
family members take up key positions in the management or board
and how those positions potentially strengthen or weaken some of
the relations that we have already documented. In a similar vein,
other researchers could integrate the effects of family relation-
ships, thereby exploring the role of family cohesion and conflict.
Next, future research could delve deeper into the effects of firm age
and the family generation. Those data were not readily available for
our study, and we consider those lacking data to be the primary
limitation of our research. Another major limitation arises from the
fact that we only had access to US SIC codes to identify industry-
diversifying M&As. Although well-accepted in the M&A literature,
such a definition fails to capture that cross-industry transactions
can still produce considerable operating synergies, such as in
vertically integrating M&As. Likewise, while acquirer shareholder
abnormal returns at deal notification are widely used to denote
M&A value creation, this metric fails to account for the acquisition
premium paid for target control. To date, it is unclear whether
family firms are more or less conservative when fixing takeover
prices. Finally, as the firms in our sample were required to be
publicly listed, we are not sure to what extent our findings would
also apply to privately-held family firms.
In addition to the above-outlined implications and avenues for
future research, our study also provides highly relevant insights for
practice. Our results could, for example, be of use to managers or
directors having to decide on accepting a position in a family-
controlled firm. Likewise, our findings on positive family
monitoring and/or incentive-alignment effects might impact the
decisions of stock market investors considering to buy a stake in a
family-controlled CE listed firm. Lastly, the conclusions from our
study also provide valuable input for regulators drafting corporate
governance rules.
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This table reports the correlation coefficients and corresponding p-values for the continuous explanatory variables for the full sample.
Table 1 presents definitions of all the variables. Correlations significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are marked with *, ** and ***,
respectively. p-values are reported in parentheses.
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